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The judiciary and political change in Africa: Developing transitional jurisprudence 
in Nigeria  
Hakeem O. Yusuf∗  
At a time of increased evaluations of law, human rights, and the rise of 
judicial power all over the globe, the work of most African judiciaries and 
the principles of the jurisprudence they espouse in promoting social 
justice remain an unlikely focus of comparative legal scholarship. This 
ought not to be so in view of the considerable activities of the courts on 
the continent in the dawn of the third wave of democratization. This 
article explores the work of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the political 
transition to democracy since 1999. Utilizing insights from the work of 
Ruti Teitel, it attempts to outline some of the major constitutional and 
extraconstitutional principles adopted by the Court in mediating 
intergovernmental contestations in the turbulent transition away from 
almost three decades of authoritarian military rule. It emerges that the 
task of fostering social transformation through the “weakest” branch 
seriously tasks the institutional integrity of the judiciary.  
Introduction 
The dynamics of Nigeria’s tottering unnegotiated political transition have led to the 
emergence of a discernible turn in the jurisprudence of an otherwise complacent and 
conservative judiciary. These decisions have shaped and, in turn, been shaped by the 
course of political transition in the country. The judiciary in recent times has been at the 
epicenter of intergovernmental contestations and individual human rights claims, and the 
judicial function has played an active and direct role in governance. Although its 
decisions have had direct relevance for policymaking and governance in the course of 
Nigeria’s troubled transition to civil democratic rule since 1999, there has been little  
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focus on the nature of the judicial role in the process of political transition, social 
transformation, and democratization in the country.  
Analysis of the work of courts in Africa, and their jurisprudence (with the 
exception of postapartheid South Africa), has hardly been a staple of comparative legal 
scholarship.1 Within the international legal academy, there seems to be a presumption 
that there is little to be learned from the judicial function in that part of the globe. But the 
reality of an increasingly globalized world belies such a narrow outlook. In particular, the 
jurisprudential principles adopted by courts in transitional societies deserve closer 
attention, not least because the judiciary has become increasingly involved in governance 
and policy making in such societies.2 By the same token, evaluations based only on the 
performance of the political branch offer an incomplete account of contemporary African 
governance. 
This article analyzes the jurisprudential approach to various claims arising from 
the sociopolitical tensions that have bedeviled Nigeria’s political transition upon the 
conclusion of almost three decades of authoritarian military rule and seeks to distill 
certain principles from that approach. The Nigerian Supreme Court has adopted certain 
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(Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), Richard H Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003-Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics 118 HARVARD L. REV. 28 (2004);Mark Tushnet, Law and 
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question 
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constitutional and extraconstitutional principles in mediating what can be described as 
“new constitutionalism” in the country—referring to the determination of an 
unprecedented number of governance-related issues by the judiciary rather than by the 
political branch.3 This is partly due to the adoption of constitutional reforms that 
guarantee a range of rights and provide for extensive powers of judicial review.  
With the transition to democratic rule and notional rehabilitation of civil 
institutions in the country, the most salient features of the country’s transitional 
jurisprudence fall under such rubrics as “peace, order, and good government,” 
“fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy,” “constitutional 
supremacy,” and “cooperative federalism.” The critical analysis of these principles as 
elucidated by the Supreme Court in the mediation of conflicts and pursuit of societal 
transformation and social justice deserves scholarly attention in light of constant 
references in the sociopolitical literature to the country as a “weak,”4 “failed,” or 
“failing” polity.5 The role of the judiciary in the political transition has been an important 
factor in holding the country together as a political entity.  
The judicial response to socioeconomic and political disputes at individual and 
intergovernmental levels has generated a transitional jurisprudence in a society 
confronted with multifaceted challenges of postauthoritarian governance reforms and 
democratic-institution building. The judiciary, particularly the appellate courts, has been 
inundated with “political” cases and has become a strategic actor in policy-decision 
making at a level unprecedented in the country’s history.6 While judicial inclinations 
have not been able to quell the controversies generated by a good number of the cases, 
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they have nonetheless shaped the direction of power contestations at intra-individual and 
intergovernmental levels in the country.  
Attention to the work of the courts is important considering the context—one 
suffused with attempts by ruling political elite with suspect democratic credentials to 
legitimize the exercise of power through the judicial process. The judiciary has been 
faced with the difficult task of maintaining the normative balance between pure politics 
and law in its interpretive institutional role. In this regard, the focus is in part on the 
implications of the ascendance of one over the other, particularly in a transitional context. 
This article is arranged in three parts: The first offers a description of the 
sociopolitical situation in the country inasmuch as it constitutes the contextual 
background to the discussion. The second offers a theoretical framework for analysis of 
transitional jurisprudence in Nigeria by examining the work of Ruti Teitel on the role of 
law in political transformations and the dynamics of constitutional adjudication in 
transitional societies. The third focuses on the developing transitional jurisprudence in 
Nigeria. Here, it emerges that the task of fostering transformation in a transitional context 
through the supposedly “weakest” branch seriously burdens the institutional integrity of 
the judiciary, in circumstances where its intervention is required for achieving desired 
social reconstruction. The article concludes that the judiciary, with the benefit of new or 
“rehabilitated” constitutional powers, has progressively assumed an important position in 
governance in the country through the dynamics of transitional constitutionalism. 
 
1. The political transition in Nigeria 
Nigeria has had a checkered history, in which military authoritarianism virtually 
destroyed the fabric of state and society. By 1999 it had witnessed almost three decades 
of military rule, interspersed with two brief spells of democratic governance.7 The 
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country’s economic and social fortunes took a nosedive as the military acted like an army 
of occupation ruling captured territory. All institutions of civil governance suffered as the 
military ruled with authoritarian decrees that undermined the Constitution.  
The military in some instances suspended parts of the Constitution and, in others, 
passed decrees that it declared (and were judicially upheld) as superior to it.8 Gross 
human rights violations abounded to an extent that the country acquired pariah status 
within the international community. Following the sudden death of General Sanni 
Abacha in mid-1998, his successor, General Abdusalam Abubakar, embarked on an 
accelerated civil transition program, culminating in elections, the handover of power to 
political office holders, and the exit of the military on May 29, 1999. Throughout the 
military era, the judiciary hovered between complicity and complacency in the misrule of 
the country while maintaining its position as the only state organ that did not experience 
institutional truncation or disruption.  
 The country has now had its longest experience of civil governance in its 
postindependence history. Rising crime rates, poverty, unemployment, the deplorable 
state of social infrastructure, and the failure of transitional justice measures for past 
victims of gross violations of human rights have all challenged an otherwise welcome 
political transition.9 However, over the past decade, the most serious challenges to 
Nigeria’s continued viability as a state have been posed by intergovernmental disputes on 
spheres of power in a lopsided federation.10 This has been accompanied by unhealthy 
wrangling for power among the political elite, pervasive corruption, and the absence of 
effective dialogue among various stakeholders to foster a consensual basis for the 
continued existence of the polity.  
                                                 
8
 Hakeem O. Yusuf, Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial 
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9
 For an account of the transitional justice issues in Nigeria, see Hakeem O. Yusuf, Travails of Truth: 
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2. Political change and the judiciary—A theoretical framework  
In her influential work on transitional justice, Ruti Teitel explores the transformative 
function of law at times of social change.11 She argues that the role of law undergoes 
“normative shifts” that distinguish it from the conception and understanding of law in 
“ordinary” times. 12 In other words, there is a shift in the understanding of the workings 
of law and its place in a society undergoing significant sociopolitical changes—what 
Teitel calls “transitional jurisprudence.”13  
According to Teitel, transitional jurisprudence is a distinct and legitimate 
conceptualization of law in societies experiencing momentous political change. Such 
societies encounter the “rule of law” dilemma, which usually arises in “politically 
controversial” cases.14 During such periods, rather than providing “foundational” 
bearings for democracy, constitutionalism takes on a “constructivist” role.15 
Constitutionalism at times of political change becomes constructivist because the 
“paradigmatic form of law that emerges in these times operate in an extra ordinary 
fashion.” The emergent legal paradigm both “stabilizes and destabilizes” existing 
conceptions of law in the transitional society.16 This dynamic is the product of 
transitional justice, with its key feature of supplementing the existing paradigms of 
justice and conceptions of rule of law. In this way, transitional justice provides a 
“balancing of ideal justice with political reality” in the task of “constructing liberalizing 
                                                 
11
 RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
12
 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 
2009, 2015 (1997). 
13
 Id. at 2015–2016. 
14
 TEITEL, supra note 11, at 11. 
15
 Id. at 191. 
16
 Id. at 220. 
  7
change.” 17 In particular, Teitel identifies adjudication as one of the most important 
mechanisms through which law constructs in transition periods.18  
Courts are ordinarily considered to be better suited for “case-by-case” decision 
making than for crafting policy. However, in transitional societies, Teitel argues, courts 
may have a strategic advantage over the political branch that derives from their more 
stable institutional existence. Furthermore, transitional disputes may lend themselves to 
“nuanced case-by-case resolution,” for which the judiciary is more competent than the 
political branch.19 Thus situated, the judiciary takes on the “ambivalent directionality of 
law.”20 Teitel’s analysis provides a theoretical framework for this study of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria in the context of the political transition in the country.  
In a polity undergoing political change from authoritarian rule, the absence of a 
sustained institutional experience and practice of constitutional democracy may result in 
the society being saddled with a fragile political branch. 21 Inevitable contestations that 
arise in the context of newfound democratic principles are typically at the center of such 
disputes. These play out on multiple fronts, including previously repressed rights claims 
for identity, autonomy, self-determination, and control of economic resources, as well as 
demands for greater accountability for the exercise of political power in line with 
(usually touted) new openness in governance. Courts in such a setting are often faced 
with resolving essentially political issues and deciding difficult, time-bound cases with 
direct bearing on the process of state reconstruction at the heart of the political transition.  
There has been substantial interplay of the foregoing claims in Nigeria’s troubled 
political transition from military authoritarian rule. The resulting dynamics have led to a 
remarkable privileging of the judiciary in the resolution of disputes regarding the 
exercise of political power in the country. In analyzing the Nigerian experience, this 
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 Id. at 213. 
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 Id. at 220. 
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 Id. 
20
 Teitel, supra note 12, at 2033. 
21
 Id. at 2033. 
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article adopts as its point of departure Teitel’s characterization of the rule of law and 
transitional constitutionalism. Her argument that “transitional constitutionalism” is both 
“constitutive” and “transformative”22 has considerable resonance with the Nigerian 
experience. So is the position that “transitional law is settled and unsettled.”23  
Further, there is an empirical consideration that further supports the adoption of 
Teitel’s model of transitional jurisprudence and the role of the judiciary. Judges in 
Nigeria hold office until a constitutionally stipulated retirement age. With judicial office 
thus protected and guaranteed, the judiciary was not subject to accountability measures 
as part of the transitional justice process, leaving its role in the country’s experience of 
authoritarian misrule unexamined. The adoption of the pretransition constitutional 
arrangements, coupled with the absence of an interim constitution (which could have 
stipulated otherwise) in the process of political change, meant that judges appointed 
during the period of authoritarian rule continued in office by default. Notwithstanding 
this institutional accountability gap, the judiciary has come to play an important role in 
the political transition to civil governance in the country.24 
 
3. Developing a transitional jurisprudence in Nigeria 
Thus, in Nigeria, an untransformed judiciary is charged with mediating what Heinz Klug 
refers to as “legalization of political conflict.”25 It has been called upon continually to 
play an active and critical role in the political reconstruction and democratic transition of 
a heterogeneous polity.26 In the discharge of that task, the judiciary from an early stage 
had been criticized for continuing to identify with a questionable jurisprudential outlook. 
Some have argued that it has accorded a knee-jerk, “spurious and simplistic” recognition 
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 Teitel, supra note 12, at 2051–2054. 
23
 Id. at 2015. 
24
 See Yusuf, supra note 9; Yusuf, supra note 10. 
25
 KLUG, supra note 2, at 12. 
26
 Yusuf, supra note 8, at 207–219. 
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to, and validation of, authoritarian rule and the legacy of decrees made by the military, 
even after the transition to civil rule.27  
In this regard, it is important to note that Nigeria lacks the new judicial institution, 
(a constitutional court) that features prominently in Teitel’s model of transitional 
jurisprudence. This was not created as part of the political transition in the country, 
although the military regime led by General Sanni Abacha had proposed doing so. To 
date, there does not appear to have been any interest in moving in that direction. 
However, even with the absence of a new judicial body, the rehabilitation of the 
constitutional powers of judicial review in the Nigerian courts has been remarkable. It is 
now apt to examine the Court’s transitional adjudication in some detail. 
 
3.1 Constitutional supremacy  
Constitutional theory commonly holds that a supreme constitution is a sine qua non for 
ensuring the autonomy of existence and powers of the central and subnational units in a 
federal polity.28 The necessity for constitutional supremacy has been a feature of 
Nigerian constitutions29 and has been restated in the very first section of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (the Constitution). Section 1 (1) provides 
that the Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on authorities 
and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Call this the ‘Supremacy 
Clause.’ Section 1(2) states that the country must be governed only in accordance with 
the Constitution. In apparent unequivocal reinforcement of the Supremacy Clause, 
section 1(3) further provides that in the event any other law is inconsistent with the 
                                                 
27
 Tunde I Ogowewo, Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative to the Survival 
of Nigeria’s Democracy, 44 J. AFRIC. L. 135, 166 (2000). Ogowewo’s position appears to be vindicated 
by current efforts to produce a new constitution. See, e.g., C Isiguzo, Ekweremadu: Nigeria Gets New 
Constitution Next Year—Senate to Begin Zonal Consultation Soon, THIS DAY ONLINE (Abuja Sunday, 
September 2, 2007). 
28
 BENJAMIN O. NWABUEZE, FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA UNDER THE PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION 21–22 
(Lagos State Ministry of Justice Law Review Series 2003). 
29
 See, e.g., § 1, CONST. NIGERIA (1960); § 1, CONST. FED. REPUB. NIGERIA (1963); § 1, CONST. FED. 
REPUB. NIGERIA (1979); § 1, CONST. FED. REPUB. NIGERIA (1989).  
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provisions of the Constitution, “this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, be void.” 
The Supremacy Clause in successive Nigerian constitutions was, however, 
continually abrogated or suspended by military legislation for the better part of three 
decades. Displeased by the attempt to tinker with its self-ascribed legislative supremacy 
in E O Lakanmi and Kikelomo Ola v The Attorney-General (Western state), The 
Secretary to the Tribunal (Investigation of Assets Tribunal) and the Counsel to the 
Tribunal (Lakanmi case),30 successive military regimes ensured passage of a military 
legislative supremacy decree as the first piece of legislation enacted after each coup 
d’etat in the country.  
Emblematic of this legislative aberration is the Constitution Suspension and 
Modification Decree No.1 of 1966 (the Supremacy Decree), which provided: “… the 
Federal Military Government shall have powers to make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.” 
Modifying the 1963 Constitution then in operation, section 1 (1) of the Supremacy 
Decree further provided: 
 This Constitution shall have force throughout Nigeria …provided that 
this Constitution shall not prevail over a decree, and nothing in this 
Constitution shall render any provision of a decree void to any extent 
whatsoever.31 
Through a replication of such provisions in successive decrees, military regimes 
repeatedly asserted the supremacy of their legislation over provisions of the Nigerian 
Constitution.  
After an initial halfhearted attempt at rescuing the principle of constitutional 
supremacy from the assault of military authoritarianism, the Supreme Court succumbed 
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 (1971) University of Ife Law Reports 201. 
31
 Emphasis added 
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to blowing muted judicial (and constitutional) “trumpets”32 for the better part of three 
decades. Thus, with the acquiescence of the judiciary, emergency legislation and 
exceptionalism became instituted as standard mode of governance in the country. 
However, with the advent of political change, the Supreme Court has become more 
assertive of the imperative of constitutional supremacy, particularly in the resolution of 
intergovernmental disputes and political contestations, a prominent aspect of political 
transition in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. A number of cases illustrate this point. 
In Attorney General of Abia State & 2 Ors v Attorney General of the Federation 
and 33 Ors (Revenue Monitoring case),33 the issue before the Court was the 
constitutionality of the Local Government Revenue Monitoring Act passed by the 
National Assembly. The plaintiff states argued that the Act, which provided for direct 
disbursement of local government allocations from the federal account and monitoring of 
the process by federal authorities, amounted to undue interference with their powers over 
the matter of local government political and fiscal administration as recognized under 
section 7, among others, of the Constitution. 34  
The main purpose of the Revenue Monitoring Act was purportedly to ensure 
allocations from the Federation Account and allocation were properly distributed to the 
local governments. This was an important policy objective considering that the 
deplorable state of infrastructure in the country is largely traceable to misappropriation of 
public funds. There was a need for initiatives to check corruption in the country. Local 
authorities have had a notoriously poor record of performance in governance over the 
years and the proper delivery of federal allocations which forms the bulk of their 
resources was an important factor in the state of affairs.  
                                                 
32
 See Wang Ching Yao and 4 Others v Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters (unreported decision of the 
Court of Appeal); a report is provided in GANI FAWEHINMI, NIGERIAN LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 436 
(Lagos Nigeria Law Publications 1986). 
33
 (2006) 7 NILR 71, 1 [hereinafter Revenue Monitoring case]. 
34
 Id. at 4–5. 
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The Court upheld the case of the plaintiffs. It emphasized that legislative action, 
no matter how laudable, must be kept within constitutionally prescribed limits, because 
legislative powers and functions are “not at large.”35 Justice Tobi in the lead judgment 
emphasized the significance of the Supremacy Clause, which mandates all three arms of 
government to conform to the provisions of the Constitution. Referring to various dicta in 
Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation and 35 Others 
(ICPC case),36 the Court reiterated its support for the anticorruption policy of the 
political branch. It however maintained that the initiative must be conducted within 
constitutionally sanctioned limits.37  
For a Court that had earlier boldly declared unanimous support for an 
anticorruption policy in the country to limit national legislative competence over state-
revenue monitoring, it was consciously treading a tight rope. As will be argued below, 
initial unequivocal judicial support for the anticorruption policy was given at the expense 
of the federal principle also in issue in this case. The reluctance of the justices to carry 
forward the ICPC precedent here would appear to be a product of subsequent national 
experience. The government at the center (whose party also had an overwhelming 
majority and a vise-like grip on the National Assembly), led by a former military head of 
state, repeatedly violated the federal principle in its executive and legislative actions. A 
rash of cases, well over a dozen, subsequently came before the Court, brought by 
aggrieved states—particularly those led by opposition parties.38 The unitarizing bent of 
the central government was to be a defining feature of the first eight years of 
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 Id. at 24. 
36
 (2002) 6 S.C. (Pt. I) 1 [hereinafter ICPC case]. See discussion below on Good Governance Clause. 
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 Revenue Monitoring case, supra note 33, at 19. 
38
 See, e.g., Attorney General of Abia & 2 Ors v Attorney General of the Federation & 33 Ors (2006) 7 
NILR 71; Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia & 35 Ors (No.2) (2002) NWLR 
542 S.C.; Attorney General of Ogun State v Attorney General of the Federation  (2002) 12 S.C. (Pt. II), 1. 
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postauthoritarian military rule, which resulted in a regrettable dissipation of resources in 
litigation.39 
The Court, challenging what was an implicit abuse of its liberal construction of 
the powers of the center in the ICPC, shifted to a more restrictive view of the federal 
principle. Thus, the approach of the Court in the Revenue Monitoring case, which 
appears on principle to be in sharp contrast to the earlier decision in ICPC, follows what 
Teitel describes as the “ambivalent directionality of law”40 in transitional 
constitutionalism. The Court had to respond to the dilemma presented by the need to 
secure a balance between a laudable policy objective with constitutional support and a 
fundamental black-letter constitutional principle. The realities of the contextual 
experience dictated a proactive judicial response as political power struggles threatened 
the stability of, and interfered with, day-to-day governance in all parts of the country.  
This section of the paper has discussed how the Supremacy Clause required all 
the institutions of state to “dance to the music and chorus that the Constitution beats and 
sings.”41 However, it is significant that in deciphering the constitutional “chorus,” the 
Court42 has generally pursued a minimalist approach, reflected in its preference for the 
“blue pencil rule.”  
 
 3.2 The blue pencil rule 
Notwithstanding the broadly couched powers of judicial review contained in sections 6 
and 315 (3) of the Constitution, in practice, the Court has consistently adopted an attitude 
of considerable judicial deference to the legislature. In case after case, when called on to 
strike down a piece of challenged legislation in its entirety, the Court has exercised 
                                                 
39
 Yusuf supra note 6 at 8-9. 
40
 Teitel, supra note 12, at 2033. 
41
 Revenue Monitoring , supra note 33, at 24. 
42
 Hon. Muyiwa Inakoju & 17 Ors v Hon. Abraham Adeolu Adeleke & 3Ors (2007) 4 NWLR 1115, 1 
NILR 121, 1, 43, available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting2007.htm (last accessed Aug. 28, 
2009). References are to the latter report based on accessibility considerations. 
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restraint. For all its seeming readiness to take on political issues and its commitment to 
uphold the Supremacy Clause, the Court has been reluctant to declare any piece of 
legislation illegal. Indeed, it has yet to invalidate any enactment in its entirety on grounds 
of unconstitutionality. In Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the 
Federation & 35 Ors (Urban Planning case),43 Justice Tobi declared that, even in cases 
where a section of a statute is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Court was duty 
bound to only “remove the chaff from the grain.”44  
The minimalist interpretive approach of the Court is rooted in its history. The 
attitude from which it has rarely departed is that it is beyond the purview of the judiciary 
to embark on wholesale striking down of legislation. The Nigerian legal and judicial 
system, though a hybrid of customary, Islamic, and common law, is in its operation and 
outlook essentially dominated by its colonial heritage of the British legal system. At 
inception, judges of the superior (and many lower) courts were trained in the British 
common law system, with its minimalist constitutional conception of the role of judges. 
Added to this is the colonial context in which the role of judges was even more linear and 
limited in governance. That has largely remained the case. In the preindependence period, 
it was virtually unthinkable that courts would upturn colonial legislation. This attitude 
had a strong influence on the postindependence judiciary, as seen in the case of Balewa v 
Doherty and Others,45 which has remained the leading authority on this area of the law 
and was indeed cited by Justice Tobi in support of his position stated above.  
Further, as mentioned earlier, a new constitutional court was not created as part of 
the transition to democracy. Consequently, judges of the old legal order, appointed in the 
period of authoritarian military rule, continue to occupy the top order of the judicial 
system. It has thus been hard for the judicial leopard to change its spots. During thirty 
years of authoritarian military rule, the judiciary, like all of Nigeria’s civil governance 
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institutions, suffered serious institutional decay, and the administration of justice had 
fallen into disrepute.46 Virtually all the members of the Court had been appointed to the 
bench by a military regime. Given the rot that had pervaded the Nigerian judiciary, and 
the perception that it had operated to legitimize authoritarian rule,47 a new judicial body 
could have provided a fresh, less encumbered jurisprudential approach. The failure to 
take this path inevitably reinforced to some degree, the historical jurisprudential leanings 
of the Court in its mediation of disputes critical to governance in the country’s political 
transition. 
The Court has constantly resorted to the “blue pencil rule” to redeem legislative 
excess, a common feature of many laws passed by the National Assembly in the period 
under review. Essentially a principle of contract law, the rule allows for a court to 
enforce a contract after first striking out a provision to make the contractual terms more 
reasonable. According to Chief Justice Muhammadu Lawal Uwais, the source of the rule 
in Nigerian jurisprudence is the second ambit of the Supremacy Clause which provides 
that any law that conflicts with the Constitution shall be void to the extent of its 
inconsistency.48 Over the years, the Nigerian Supreme Court has actively extended the 
blue pencil rule to allow it to strike out or void offending aspects of legislation, usually 
with a view to saving the nonoffending provisions.  
Mediating the legacy of distorted federalism in Nigeria’s unnegotiated political 
transition is a critical challenge for ensuring the viability of the country’s 
democratization process. This is especially the case given the background of elite 
manipulation of a diverse ethnic composition in the bid to secure power and control a 
stake in the poorly regulated but rich natural resources industry. Military authoritarianism, 
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perceived to be largely fostered and dominated by a segment of the multiethnic state, has 
been a source of civil strife (including a bloody civil war), loss of lives and properties, 
instability, and social tension over the years. A number of cases illustrate how the Court 
has utilized the blue pencil concept to mediate the legacy of a distorted federal polity 
among other structural and institutional distortions in the postauthoritarian period.  
In the ICPC case, the Court found that sections 26 (3) and 35 of the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 were in violation of the fundamental 
right to liberty guaranteed under section 35 of the Constitution, and struck them down. 
Chief Justice Uwais anchored this approach on the Court’s tradition of saving intra vires 
parts of legislation.49 The other six justices all held similar views in their concurring 
decision on this aspect of the matter.  
Application of the blue pencil rule is a common thread running through structural 
judicial review of much contentious legislation between the federal government and 
various states in the country.50 It has been observed that in its postauthoritarian political 
transition, the Nigerian state has found structural judicial review, “a more reliable 
mechanism for achieving a balance of power and deepening democracy.”51 The judicial 
reference in this case to the balance of power is significant, understood in its historical 
and contemporary context. From the historical point of view, the judicial penchant for the 
blue pencil rule is essentially a carryover from the days of judicial caution and deference 
to legislative authority both in the colonial and postindependent authoritarian experience. 
It served the judiciary well as an instrument of self-preservation. 
In the current context, the balance of power issue is one that impacts on the 
consolidation of democratic governance in the postauthoritarian period. The checkered 
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institutional experience of the political branches has distinguished the judiciary as the 
forum of choice for the resolution of numerous vertical and horizontal jurisdictional 
disputes. The situation has been complicated by the continued existence on the statute 
books of a considerable number of unitarizing laws. A direct consequence has been the 
pivotal need for mediating emergent disputes to facilitate effective delivery of public 
services.  
Thus, in adopting the blue pencil approach to judicial review of legislation where 
a more activist approach was desirable, the Court was following Teitel’s propositions of 
transitional constitutionalism. In “constructing liberalizing change” transitional 
judiciaries have to balance “ideal justice” with “political reality.”52 An all out activist 
approach in the context was capable of threatening the institutional power and relevance 
of the judiciary itself. The Court, having been nurtured in an atmosphere of 
authoritarianism, must have been apprehensive about the prospects for implementation of 
such radical decisions by the political branch. But there is another worry. While 
privileged by its relatively stable institutional role, it could not take public confidence, a 
vital normative value for the legitimacy and effectiveness of its decisions, for granted. 
Thus, the blue pencil approach, in important political cases, constituted a relatively safe 
jurisprudential choice from an institutional perspective. 
  
3.3 Cooperative federalism  
Section 2 (2) of the Constitution prescribes that the country shall be a “Federation 
consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory.” But while this foundational 
principle has been textually preserved through successive constitutions, the experience of 
military rule for almost three decades has hollowed it out, rendering it one of the most 
often breached of those principles, second only perhaps to the Supremacy Clause.  
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In practice, the military ruled in a unitary fashion easily suited to its command-
based institutional structure. However, federalism remained such a sensitive issue in the 
country that the military was obliged to pay lip service to its preservation. The single 
bold attempt to formally replace the federal arrangement with a unitary system was a 
major element in the country’s descent into a thirty-month civil war.53 All the same, the 
military left the country as a lopsided federation with an incongruent allocation of 
powers to the center and what has grown into thirty-six weak, fractionalized states; a far 
cry from the powerful three regions in place at the inception of military rule in 1966.54  
The federal government has acquired so many powers that is has come to exercise 
control over virtually every aspect of day-to-day governance. It not only controls foreign 
affairs, the security agencies, the armed forces, and currency, it also exclusively controls 
or oversees commerce and trade, social security, labor, weights and measures, and vital 
aspects of land policy within the states. It has effectively taken over the arena of 
“ordinary governance,” 55 extending well beyond the regular spheres contemplated for a 
central government within a regular federation. Predictably, this dominance by the 
federal government has secured for it a disproportionate share of the country’s 
resources.56 Military authoritarianism likewise ensured the repression of any serious 
discontent with this state of pseudofederalism. It is thus little wonder that claims on 
federalism would emerge from military authoritarianism as a major source of conflict in 
intergovernmental relations in the political transition. 
In mediating the consistent demands for restructuring the country away from this 
state of affairs, the Court, explicitly in one case and implicitly in others, has advanced the 
                                                 
53
 Hakeem O. Yusuf, The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transition—A Critique, GLOBAL JURIST vol. 
7, issue 3, article 4, 1 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss3/art4/. See also IGNATIUS 
AKAYAAR AYUA & DAKAS C. J. DAKAS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1, 4 (2005), available at    
http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Global_Dialogue/Book_1/BK1-C08-ng-AyuaDakas-en.pdf. 
54
 Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, Federalism in Nigeria’s New Democratic Polity 32 (2) PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF 
FEDERALISM 73, 76-77 (2002). 
55
 NWABUEZE, supra note 28, at vi. 
56
 Ladipo Adamolekun, Nigerian Federation at the Crossroads: The Way Forward (2005) 35 PUBLIUS: 
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 383, 390. 
  19
doctrine of “cooperative federalism.” It has been a major feature of the Court’s approach 
to renegotiating the country’s federalism in series of intergovernmental disputations that 
have challenged effective governance in Nigeria from 1999 to date. In his dissent in the 
Urban Planning case, Justice Ayoola made explicit the doctrine. He enunciated the 
principle as the basis for holding that the “Environmental Clause” contained in section 20 
of the Constitution conferred concurrent powers of urban and regional planning on both 
the states and the federal government. The justice observed that it was quite possible for 
the two tiers of government to work together for achieving environmental protection 
goals without compromising the norms of a federation as envisaged by the 
Constitution.57 
As envisaged by Justice Ayoola, the principle allows the federation to 
legitimately pursue certain constitutional goals, particularly those stated in the directive 
principles in Chapter II of the Constitution, without compromising the autonomy of the 
states. The legitimacy of the approach may also be located in the need to ensure the 
fulfillment of an international obligation.58 But the subjective fluidity and inherent 
tensions of this principle have made its application hugely contentious, rendering 
problematic its explication in the Court’s transitional jurisprudence. The question that 
necessarily arises is how to ensure a balance in the operation of such an approach to 
ensure compliance with the letter of other constitutional provisions and the overall tenor 
of the Constitution. This is germane given the Court’s focus on ensuring compliance with 
due process and rule of law in governance, in contradistinction to the autocratic approach 
of military rule at the root of breaches of the federalism principle. 
Justice Ayoola addressed this issue by formulating a two-part test to determine 
the legitimacy of policies that threaten the federal principle. In the first stage, the court 
determines whether from the provisions of the enactment in question, such an enactment 
is ‘rationally referable’ to achieving an objective set out in the directive principles of the 
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Constitution. In other words, a court examines whether or not the exercise of the power 
in dispute clearly lies outside the goals of the Constitution properly construed. If it does 
not, the case should proceed no further. If it does, then a court should ask whether the 
implicated provisions conform to the recognition of federalism as a fundamental 
constitutional element of the country’s political arrangements.59  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the cooperative approach, with its 
inherent notion of overriding subnational autonomy, with preservation of the 
fundamental principle of federalism as guaranteed by the Constitution; at least not in 
Justice Ayoola’s articulation in this case. The formulation appears dubious, not least 
because it elides the very basis of the country’s adoption of federalism—the need to 
preserve the autonomy of the regions and provide them opportunities for development 
based on their preferences. It is thus not surprising that the justice came to the interesting 
determination (despite dissenting) that the disputed Urban and Regional Planning Act did 
not pass the tests of validity that he devised. This, despite his opinion that the 
Environment Clause could justify federal legislation aimed at delimiting planning powers 
in a manner that would ensure environmental protection without compromising the 
sovereignty of the states. According to Justice Ayoola, “imagination and perspicacity” 
were all that was required to achieve this.60  
What manner of imagination or the nature of the perspicacity Justice Ayoola has 
in mind remains undefined. Suffice to note that the majority did not share that view. 
Interestingly too, he found no validation for the Act at issue because its provisions 
regulated land use and granted the central government power of a nature that would lead 
to the demise of the federal principle.61 The judiciary, as guardian of the Constitution 
must prevent such an outcome.62 He thus ended by granting the reliefs sought by the 
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plaintiff on virtually the same basis (upholding federalism stricto sensu) as did the 
majority decision (of four of the seven-justice constitutional panel).  
Maintaining the federal status of the country as a foundational principle has long 
been a fundamental issue in postindependent Nigeria. Notwithstanding brazen violations 
of the principle by successive military regimes, it is been accepted that only a federal 
polity can ensure equity and protect the rights of hundreds of minority groups 
amalgamated by colonial power into a nation state. The opportunity for political change 
afforded by democratization brought to the front burner real and imagined complaints of 
marginalization from all parts of the country.63  
Judicial preference for a cooperative approach, essentially a pacifist approach to 
the resolution of a highly sensitive and divisive issue, has the trappings of transitional 
adjudication with its intrinsic feature of constructivism. In the Nigerian context, the 
judiciary, in recognition of the need to restore the distorted equilibrium of power and the 
agitations for true federalism, proclaimed the extensive physical planning and 
development powers of the federating states within their boundaries. However, partly in 
recognition of the various infrastructural developments (sometimes improperly) 
undertaken and located by the central government in the states, it sought to temper the 
impact of a full-blown recognition of state control over physical planning and 
development. Not the least because of the interest of third parties who despite their stakes 
could not join the case as a result of procedural exclusions.  
In summing up, it can be said that agitations for true federalism remain highly 
contentious in the postauthoritarian period. Many hold the view that meaningful and 
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sustainable development can not take root in the country without it. The role of the Court 
in resolving critical political contestations framed in legal terms, resolution of which has 
largely eluded the political branches, remains important. It is in this circumstance that the 
Court again fits Teitel’s model of the transitional judiciary perforce involved in a 
“constructivist role” in a postauthoritarian society.  
 
3.4 Fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy  
The Court has also utilized the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state 
policy to much effect in developing transitional jurisprudence. An important innovation 
in constitution making in postindependence Nigeria was the introduction of fundamental 
objectives and directive principles of state policy (directive principles) in Chapter II of 
the 1979 Constitution. Driven perhaps by disenchantment with the cumulative experience 
of decades of colonialism succeeded by military rule, the directive principles include 
provisions for economic, social, and cultural rights. It provides for social justice and 
democracy as the basis of governance, proclaims the objective of national integration, 
and prohibits discrimination. Section 13 stipulates that it shall be duty and responsibility 
of all organs of government, authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive, or 
judicial powers to conform to, observe, and apply the provisions of the chapter. They 
likewise affirm that the State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuses of power in 
addition to setting out specific duties of citizens. In general, the chapter (and this has 
been repeated in the 1999 Constitution) provides for a robust body of virtually all 
conceivable noble objectives and broad policy statements to which a modern state may 
aspire. 
Significantly, like similar provisions in the Indian Constitution, these directive 
principles of state policy are nonjusticiable. Section 6 (6) (c) of the Constitution inveighs 
decisively against judicial review or enforcement of the rights that appear embedded in 
the section. According to it, the judicial powers conferred by section 6 shall not, except 
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as otherwise provided by the Constitution, extend to any issue as to whether any act or 
omission by any authority or person, or any law or judicial decision, is in conformity 
with the directive principles.64 It is this provision that has led to the description of the 
directive principles as “exhortations of best practices.”65  
However, in a significant jurisprudential move, the Supreme Court has recently 
made it possible for the otherwise nonjusticiable provisions of Chapter II to be given 
effect. In the ICPC case, it held that some of the directive principles could be made 
justiciable through legislation.66 The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the creation 
by the National Assembly of offenses of corruption and a monolith agency with 
jurisdiction over all public and private residents of Nigeria by the National Assembly 
was unconstitutional. The plaintiff’s argument was that this did not form part of the 
Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists of the powers of the National Assembly and 
the Federal Government and that, in line with constitutional law and practice in Nigeria, 
corruption was a residual matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.  
The federal government based its defense largely on a joint construction of 
sections 15 (5) and 88 (2) (a) (b), and item 60 (a) of the Constitution. Item 60 (a) 
provides that the National Assembly has the power to establish and regulate authorities 
for the federation or any part of it in order to promote and enforce the observance of the 
directive principles contained in the Constitution. Section 15 (5) provides that “The State 
shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.” Finally, section 88 (2) (a) (b) of 
the Constitution provides that the National Assembly shall have the power to “expose 
corruption, inefficiency or waste in the administration of laws within its legislative 
competence.”  
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 The Court upheld the legality of the Corrupt and Other Related Offences Act 
No.5 of 2000 (ICPC Act).67 It found that it was within the powers of the National 
Assembly to enact the ICPC Act under item 60 (a) of the Constitution as argued by the 
federal government. Chief Justice Uwais stated in the lead decision that the directive 
principles with respect to section 15 (5) on the duty of the State (federal and state 
governments) to abolish corrupt practices can only be enforced by legislation. The chief 
justice dismissed the argument that the anticorruption law ought to be limited to public 
officials and the three branches of government: a liberal interpretation commended 
extension of its purview to all persons and institutions in the country for the objective to 
be realized.68 In all events, since corruption is “not a disease which afflicts public officers 
alone,” any measure designed to combat it “must be pervasive to cover every segment of 
the society.”69 Justice Uwaifo similarly expressed the view that the purpose of the 
directive principles is best served when they come alive rather than remain “mere or 
pious declarations.”70 The National Assembly and the Federal Executive were 
empowered to enact legislation to make them effective as the situation required.71 Thus 
the Court employed the directive principles to strengthen the foundations of governance 
in the country.  
The timing of the decision and the position of the majority could not be more apt 
considering, as stated earlier, the disturbing record of corruption in the country. The 
majority view constituted the settled position of the law in recognition of the expedience 
of transitional constitutionalism articulated by Teitel. Here, the attitude of the Court, it 
can be argued, is that the law, though unchanged in its letter had to be moved, at least in 
spirit, closer to the needs of the society, especially at a time of critical political change. In 
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this way, the decision mirrors Teitel’s proposition that transitional jurisprudence 
sometimes displaces existing conceptions of law in society. 
Further, it is remarkable that each of the three dissenting justices (including Chief 
Justice Uwais) in the Urban Planning case referred to ICPC, stating that the 
interpretation given therein to section 15 (5) of the Constitution to uphold the validity of 
the ICPC Act should apply equally to section 20, at issue in this case, so as to validate the 
Nigerian Urban Planning Decree. The slim majority of four justices had declared a 
number of provisions of the decree unconstitutional for purporting to confer on the 
federal government the powers of urban and regional planning for the whole country. 
Justice Tobi emphasized that the case, like ICPC, turned on the directive principles of 
state policy, dealing in this instance with the environment and so should be decided in the 
same manner.72  
Clearly, the Court is moving toward a radical position on the constitutional 
relevance of directive principles to fill a perceived gap in existing legislation. The motive 
appears to be the need to bridge the distance between aspirational values expressed in the 
Constitution into beneficial, tangible, and accessible social experience in view of the 
peculiar realities of the times. In other words, in its advertence to the directive principles, 
the Court evinced a strong intention to reshape social experience in the country. This 
approach is shared both in the unanimous decision in ICPC and the strong minority 
opinion in Urban Planning.  
 
3.5 Peace, order, and good government 
The need to maintain peace, order and good government has been another central theme 
of the contestations in the country’s transitional jurisprudence. The “Good Government” 
clause, contained in section 4 of the Constitution, provides that the National Assembly 
shall have the power to make laws for the “peace, order and good government of the 
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Federation or any part thereof.” Reliance on this provision constituted a key element of 
the federal government’s claim in a number of cases relating to delimitation of central 
and subnational powers in the federation.  
While the Good Government Clause formed a ratio decidendi in the unanimous 
decision of the Court in the ICPC case, the Court was aware the decision was essentially 
policy-based and, to a considerable degree, undermined the federal status of the country 
as enshrined in the Constitution. Justice Ogwuegbu was perhaps the most forthright in his 
admission that the ICPC Act constituted an affront to the principle of federalism because 
it directly interfered with the autonomy of the states. However, he found it tolerable to 
sacrifice such autonomy in favor of the overriding priority that he and other members of 
the Court’s Constitutional Panel accorded to the power of the National Assembly to 
make laws for the “peace, order and good government of the Federation.” According to 
Justice Ogwuegbu, “Corrupt practices and abuse of power can, if not checked, threaten 
the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof,” 73 and the 
ICPC Act was a fitting enactment for ensuring the peace, order, and good government of 
the country.74 Since the law was enacted by the National Assembly, it was entitled to 
have “paramount force” in the country.75 He was supported in his opinion by Justice 
Uwaifo.76 
Thus, in the ICPC case, a fundamental policy objective attracted unanimous 
support of the Court even as it compromised another constitutional imperative. However, 
the Court will not necessarily uphold such an approach if the issue at stake is a purely 
political matter, as was evident in Attorney General of Abia & 35 Ors v Attorney General 
of the Federation (the Electoral Act case),77 a decision delivered barely three months 
earlier. The crux of the case for the plaintiffs (the states of the federation) was that 
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certain provisions of the Electoral Act 2001, a law made by the National Assembly to 
regulate federal, state, and local elections, exceeded the assembly’s jurisdiction and 
threatened the very existence of the country. The federal government contested this 
position, seeking essentially to rely on the powers of the National Assembly under 
section 4 (2) of the Constitution, the Good Government Clause.  
In dismissing the federal government’s defense, the Court took a stand against the 
overt federal attempt to appropriate all powers incidental to the regulation of the political 
process, upholding a restricted ambit of the Good Government Clause. The full 
significance of the Court’s position is best appreciated in the context of the political 
backdrop to the case. In Nigeria, control of electoral mechanisms and processes, 
particularly electoral commissions, has translated directly into political victory. Given 
specific provisions of the Constitution on the matter, the law in contention would most 
likely not have passed legislative scrutiny, but for the overwhelming majority control 
wielded by the ruling party.  
Although the Electoral Act case predated ICPC, the Court has since left little 
doubt that it prefers a more restricted view of the Good Government Clause as the right 
approach to the interpretation of section 4 (2) of the Constitution. In the Revenue 
Monitoring case (decided later), it rejected the federal government’s attempt to rely on 
the holding in ICPC, which would give priority to a policy argument—namely, the need 
to check corruption and abuse of office.78 The Court declined, however noble the 
objective, to turn a blind eye to unconstitutionally passed legislation,79 thus rejecting the 
broad-based policy approach to corruption that dominated the unanimous decision in 
ICPC.  
Even more telling, the Court rejected the attempt by the National Assembly to 
create a criminal offense under the Revenue Monitoring Act to check diversion of local 
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government funds by state government officials. It conceded that the assembly could 
make legislation that contained penal provisions, but with the caveat that it must be 
“vindicated” by the Constitution.80 In this way, the Court made an implicit turnaround in 
its perspective on the salience of section 4 (2) and the amount of weight to be accorded to 
an anticorruption policy that was in explicit tension with a fundamental constitutional 
principle. The majority distinguished ICPC from the Revenue Monitoring case by 
making the dubious claim that corruption was not a prominent aspect of the latter.81  
Significant in this case, however, is the dissent of two members of the 
constitutional panel. In particular, there is Justice Musdapher, who referred to the 
unanimous decision of the Court in ICPC and the ratio decidendi that supported the 
anticorruption initiative of the federal government. His solidly founded opinion recalls 
the holding in ICPC that the national legislature is best suited to make legislation on 
subject matter whose impact is felt all over the country (and even beyond its borders). 
The exercise of such legislative power, on a liberal construction of all relevant parts of 
the Constitution, cannot be considered an interference with the autonomy of the states.82  
Justice Musdapher found no justification for deviating from the policy-based 
approach of the earlier decision.83 He emphasized that the Supreme Court has “the sacred 
duty” to give “life” to the “noble ideas” located in the Constitution; thus, it was obliged 
to adopt a judicial approach that actively translates “abstract concepts” articulated in the 
Constitution into reality.84 According to him, the Good Government Clause empowered 
the National Assembly to ensure transparency and check “the twin vices of corruption 
and abuse of power.”85 Provided the Revenue Monitoring Act was intended to achieve 
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this objective of the Constitution, the National Assembly was acting within its powers to 
have enacted it.86  
The court’s about-face in Revenue Monitoring can be explained in transitional 
jurisprudential terms, given some background: The ICPC Act was passed a few months 
after the inauguration of the new civil administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
whose proclaimed anticorruption policy attracted immense popular support. The country 
was reeling from revelations of staggering corruption of past military regimes, 
particularly that of General Sanni Abacha, which by some accounts had run into billions 
of dollars. Public utilities and basic social infrastructure like roads, public health 
institutions, potable water, electricity, and others were in state of dilapidation or were 
altogether absent. Many were unable to afford three meals a day. 
When the Court heard ICPC, it was aware of the depth of public outrage at the 
perceived reluctance of the National Assembly to pass the ICPC Act, and of national and 
international concern over the situation. As Justice Ogwuegbu put it, “all Nigerians” with 
the exception of “those who benefit from it” were “unhappy with the level of 
corruption”87 in Nigeria, which, according to Justice Mohammed, might be among “the 
most corrupt nations on earth.”88  
We see at play in ICPC the constructive role of adjudication in transitional 
contexts as contemplated by Teitel. The Court consciously promoted policy over law 
displaying an active engagement with the society in transition. The judicial approach 
constitutes identification with the social realities of its environment where there is a 
consensus that national development has been stunted by corruption for decades, and the 
urgent need for comprehensive action to combat the menace at all levels; local and 
national, public and private. 
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While the work of judges, particularly nonelected ones, is theoretically immune 
from considerations of public outrage, the extent to which judges take cognizance of 
public opinion remains open to debate.89 Political science research suggests that the 
United States Supreme Court’s decisions, for example, have substantially reflected 
prevailing mass public opinion.90 While there are no such studies on the Nigerian 
judiciary, the Court’s unanimous decision in support of an anticorruption policy in the 
ICPC case presumably responded in some measure to the prevailing indignation on the 
issue.  
Moreover, ICPC offered the Court, as the apex judicial body, an attractive 
opportunity for institutional self-redemption and movement away from a compromised 
institution by the ancien regime. Having itself borne the stigma of a corrupt institution 
over the years, the judiciary was well aware of the need to utilize all available 
opportunities to secure a modicum of legitimacy for its otherwise complacent judicial 
approach to and legitimation of military rule in the country.91 Realizing the need for a 
moral high ground for legitimizing judicial authority in the postauthoritarian period, the 
Court seized on the leverage afforded by ICPC. Again, as Teitel suggests, this is not an 
unusual course for a transitional judiciary adjudicating highly political cases in societies 
undergoing drastic political change.  
However, following judicial support for the sweeping powers of the 
anticorruption agencies, the apprehension in quarters opposed to the thrust of the 
anticorruption legislation appeared to have been vindicated to some extent. In the 
implementation of the policy, it was constantly alleged that the federal government 
invoked those powers selectively, targeting political opponents in the run-up to the 
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crucial 2007 general elections.92 This led to renewed calls for restructuring of the 
government and decentralization to achieve fairness and equilibrium in the allocation of 
powers and resources among the tiers of government. Calls for restructuring were 
perhaps strongest in the area of fiscal federalism to which the criminalization of corrupt 
practices was connected. This background seems to have set the stage for a more 
cautious approach in subsequent judicial encounters with the anticorruption policy.  
At the time the Court heard Revenue Monitoring, it felt itself on fairly safe 
ground to rethink its rather robust support for the (by this time suspect) anticorruption 
policy of the Obasanjo administration. Much as it affirmed continued support for an 
anticorruption agenda, the Court adopted a different jurisprudential approach in Revenue 
Monitoring than it had done three years earlier in ICPC. In Revenue Monitoring, the 
majority chose to strike down legislation that sought to override the principle of 
federalism.93 There was presumably an institutional decision, discernible in the judgment 
of the Court in the Revenue Monitoring case, to hold the federal government more 
accountable to other constitutional values, particularly in light of the prevailing 
sociopolitical preference for a truly federal polity. Put another way, the Court was alert to 
the need to distance itself from the federal government, which had lost some ground in its 
effort to portray a robust anticorruption policy as justification for the continued erosion 
of the federal principle.94 
The Court’s position is reflective of public disillusionment with the manner in 
which the Obasanjo administration was pursuing its policy objectives. That 
administration had alienated many otherwise supportive stakeholders in the country, not 
least the states, most of which challenged the validity of the anticorruption motive as a 
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ground for eroding the country’s federal character. The federal government had 
dissipated valuable public and institutional support for the anticorruption “war”.95  
The Court’s decision in the Revenue Monitoring case highlights the convergence 
of the constitutive and transformative role of law that, according to Teitel, marks out law 
in transitional societies as sui generis. The Court found itself in a rather fluid social 
constitutive process that characterizes transitional adjudication; hence the apparent 
tension between the judicial preferences in ICPC and Revenue Monitoring.  
Challenged by the limits of available legal instruments in the varied political and 
policy disputations it has been called upon to adjudicate, the Court has sought to reach 
out of its customary parochial jurisprudential preference to avail itself of judicial 
experiences elsewhere.  
  
3.5 International and comparative law 
Scholars of comparative constitutional law and transitional jurisprudence have pointed to 
the value of reference to international and comparative law as important sources for 
progressive and rights-based adjudication.96 In the Nigerian experience, adoption of this 
new trend is commendably demonstrated in the ICPC case. This is quite significant when 
it is considered that the Court, particularly under authoritarian rule, had hitherto 
demonstrated a judicial proclivity for ignoring even relevant international law obligations 
of the country. However, in this case, while relying heavily on the fundamental directives 
of state policy, the Court referred to various international instruments and norms in 
support of its unanimous decision to validate the ICPC Act as appropriate legislation for 
combating a national menace in the context of political change.  
To provide a basis for prioritizing political considerations over the fundamental 
principle of federalism, the justices, among other considerations, took notice of the 
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Recommendation on 
Bribery and Corruption in International Business Transactions. They likewise cited the 
resolution of the United Nations Economic and Social Council on corruption97 to justify 
their support for a “centrally coordinated approach to the fight against corruption.”98 
Justice Uwaifo was unequivocal about the importance of international considerations, 
asserting that the corruption and abuse of power had become one of international concern. 
This reality, he opined, justified addressing the problem through a federal agency.99 
In addition, the Court registered approval for comparative law as it sanctioned the 
position that the directive principles of state policy contained in the Constitution could be 
made justiciable. These are ordinarily treated as soft laws, and nonjusticiable in Nigerian 
constitutional law. In this regard, Justice Uwaifo referred to India and Ireland, whose 
fundamental constitutional objectives and directive principles of state policy are similar 
to Nigeria’s. He quoted approvingly an excerpt from Durga Das Basu’s Commentary on 
the Constitution of India: 
Under the Irish Constitution, it has been suggested that the Courts, in deciding 
cases relating to the subject-matter of the declarations are bound to take 
cognizance of the general tendency of these declarations, even while legislative 
effect has not been given to them.100  
Justice Uwaifo noted that the position in India strongly suggested the need to 
ensure the directive principles were not “a dead letter.”101 He went on to review various 
Australian, American, Canadian, and Indian authorities,102 to seek judicial support for 
validating legislation that, even by the admission of the chief justice, impinged upon the 
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autonomy of the states.103 All other members of the seven-justice panel104 similarly cited 
foreign authorities in their concurrences.105 Thus, the Court found justification in 
comparative law for its decision as it sought to achieve a major policy objective. 
Commendable as this approach may be, the legal status of comparative law in 
Nigerian transitional jurisprudence remains unclear. A pall of uncertainty has been cast, 
ironically, by a contemporaneous decision of the Court in Justice Chukwudifu Oputa 
(Rtd.) and Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission and Gani Fawehinmi, v 
General Ibrahim Babangida, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and Brigadier Kunle Togun (Oputa 
Panel case).106 In that case, the Court demonstrated  a marked reticence toward 
international and comparative law, lamentably so, considering that Oputa Panel related 
to the country’s international obligation to provide redress for gross violations of human 
rights that had taken place during the period of authoritarian rule. Rather than relying on 
ICPC, the Court cited section 35 (1) of the Constitution, which guarantees personal 
liberty, to reject the right of victims of gross violations of human rights to truth under 
regional human rights instruments and international law.  
The Court did not utilize the opportunity presented by Oputa Panel to contribute 
to the developing jurisprudence on the right to truth for victims of gross human rights 
violations. This right has been developed more clearly in regional human rights systems 
elsewhere, particularly in the Inter-American Human Rights System.107 In the case of 
Africa, it is argued that the right to truth is guaranteed by article 19 of the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights and article 9(1) of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (African Charter).  
The Court rejected the applicant’s reliance on and reference to the African 
Charter as basis for the truth-telling process in the country. Although it conceded the 
Oputa Panel was set up to deal with human rights violations, the Court held that for 
treaty obligations to apply, there would have to have been specific legislation 
establishing the Oputa Panel and investing it with the powers to carry out an inquiry of 
this nature. The constitutional panel of the Supreme Court of Nigeria made only a token 
reference to international human rights law despite the country’s double obligation in 
respect of the African Charter, which is at once an international treaty as well as national 
legislation. Here, the Court was clearly reluctant to assume an activist stance.  
It has been argued that the Court’s interpretive approach in Oputa Panel, even in 
relation to other constitutional provisions and legislation within the national context, is 
erroneous.108 This derives from the fundamental disregard of the important role of 
international and comparative law in the context of transition in the decision. Clinging to 
an unrepentant and rigid formalist jurisprudence, the Court essentially facilitated state 
impunity for gross violations of human rights committed during almost three decades of 
military authoritarian rule in the country. The approach of the Court in Oputa Panel cast 
doubts on the sincerity of its progressive references to international law in the 
contemporaneous ICPC case.  
Set against other features of transitional adjudication discussed above, reference 
to and conformity with international law remain a point on which the Court’s transitional 
jurisprudence seems ambivalent, although ICPC constitutes a significant attempt to move 
away from the distinctly parochial approach that pervaded the Court’s decisions in the 
authoritarian period. It may be observed that, at the time of Oputa Panel and ICPC, the 
Court was engaged in a struggle to come to terms with the implications of the changed 
                                                 
108
 Yusuf, supra note 53, at 7. 
  36
political situation in the country—a struggle that has yet to abate. Nonetheless, the 
intermittently receptive attitude of the Court toward international and comparative law 
has had beneficial results for the resolution of some of the challenges the Court has faced 
in the context of an unnegotiated political transition with its legacy of contentious but 
unaddressed issues.  
4. Conclusion 
There is something to be learned from the interplay of politics, law, and adjudication in 
the African experience of transition that remains largely ignored in the literature. In the 
illustrative Nigerian experience, the judiciary has undertaken review in controversial 
areas (such as federalism and anticorruption) with direct significance for the 
sociopolitical problems and challenges of political transition from authoritarian rule. 
While this reflects an impetus to transformation, it is nonetheless apparent that the 
judiciary is limited by its constitutional status, the country’s legal and political traditions 
regarding judicial review, and the judiciary’s status as a holdover institution. These two 
competing realities have made for interesting opinions, split decisions, and, occasionally, 
the resort to a minimalist approach, as reflected in the so called “blue pencil” rule. They 
have also spurred the use of comparative law in the court’s jurisprudence, as it has had 
frequently had need for an alternative source of normativity as a basis for adjudication. 
The results have predictably been mixed. 
Transformative adjudication is a vital, if not plainly indispensable, tool for social 
reconstruction in postauthoritarian societies. The role of the courts in deploying law to 
the service of societal renewal is clearly challenging in negotiated transitions that are 
usually accompanied by the establishment of new and unencumbered judicial institutions. 
But it is decidedly tasking where the judiciary is itself in need of transformation and 
where political change has come about through an unnegotiated process of political 
change. The attempts of the Nigerian judiciary—through forging a transitional 
jurisprudence— to come to terms with political change, illustrate the challenges of such 
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an enterprise. The process can be unsettling for the judiciary itself, despite the latter’s 
presumed institutional advantage in transitional societies. The fluidity of political action 
in particular poses a huge challenge to transitional jurisprudence. The judiciary must 
navigate uncertainty, inconsistency, and abuse of power while attempting to craft a 
forward-looking jurisprudence in response to novel situations, and must address issues 
that ordinarily would be subject to political determination.  
 
The Nigerian Supreme Court is aware, at least implicitly, of the value of 
“transformative adjudication” that Teitel describes as “self-regarding.”109 Though salient 
questions remain as to the clear emergence of a transitional jurisprudence in the Nigerian 
setting, it can be reasonably argued that the judicial terrain has changed since the end of 
authoritarian rule. In working toward what may be optimistically regarded as a 
transitional jurisprudence, the judiciary, characterized in the past as complicit with gross 
violations of human rights and misgovernance,110 seems to be seeking institutional 
redemption. 
In the cases discussed herein, and in others, the Court has employed an expansive 
interpretation of existing texts, such as the Supremacy Clause and the Good Governance 
provisions of the Constitution, to mediate critical political disputes in the 
postauthoritarian period. In this process, the Court has to some degree articulated a 
jurisprudence to meet the needs of the political transition. In particular, its innovative 
take on the interpretation of the relevance and status of the fundamental objectives and 
directive principles of state policy has signaled a promising break with the conservative 
jurisprudential attitude of the past. 
The evolution of jurisprudential preferences from the earlier stances of the Court 
in the ICPC case to the later Revenue Monitoring case, on principally the same policy 
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question, poignantly reflects the paradox inherent in the constitutive and transformative 
role of law in the flux of political change. When the country embarked on a truth-telling 
process at the dawn of the transition, the judiciary—as an institution that had actively 
participated in governance in the period of authoritarian rule—remained unaccounted for. 
This underscores the need for judicial accountability in postauthoritarian contexts. 
A related point that emerges from the discussion in this article is the nature of the 
internal conflict with which the transitional judiciary sometimes must struggle. This can 
be particularly acute in the determination of intergovernmental contestations. It is 
instructive in this regard that, concluding his concurring decision in the Urban Planning 
case, Justice Ejiwunmi explained that he was unable to conclude the matter as decided by 
the Chief Justice.111 Such divided opinion speaks to the jurisprudential gulf that can be 
found in the decisions of judges in overly political matters even in the highest courts. The 
Nigerian Supreme Court is no exception.  
Notwithstanding noticeable tension in some of the decisions of the Court in the 
postauthoritarian period, it is now almost beyond doubt that neither the Court’s 
jurisprudence nor Nigeria’s sociopolitical terrain will be the same again. The Court’s 
involvement with adjudicating transitional disputes has ensured this. Through this 
involvement, the Court in particular and the Nigerian judiciary in general, have finally 
taken a strategic position in governance after years of institutional lethargy. Despite the 
absence of a new judicial institution in the country, certain judicial decisions of the Court 
suggest that “rehabilitated” judicial powers can be deployed to achieve similar results to 
those obtained from newly created constitutional courts elsewhere.  
Judging from the Nigerian experience however, it appears that courts burdened 
with a tarnished institutional past are unable to avail themselves of the hope inherent in 
the “clean slates” that new courts enjoy. Transitional jurisprudence may indeed be better 
suited to an unburdened judiciary. It is this reality that weighs like an albatross around 
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the collective neck of the Nigerian judiciary as it plays an inevitable active role in 
reconstructing a postauthoritarian society based on liberal democratic principles.  
